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Abstract Memory	   Detection	   Tests	   (MDTs)	   are	   a	   general	   class	   of	   psychophysi-­‐ological	  tests	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  whether	  someone	  remembers	  a	  particular	  fact	  or	  datum.	  The	  P300	  MDT	  is	  a	  type	  of	  MDT	  that	  relies	  on	  a	  presumed	   correlation	   between	   a	   detectable	   neural	   signal	   (the	   P300	  “brainwave”)	   in	   a	   test	   subject,	   and	   the	   recognition	   of	   those	   facts	   in	   the	  subject’s	  mind.	  The	  P300	  MDT	  belongs	  to	  a	  class	  of	  brain-­‐based	  forensic	  technologies	   which	   have	   proved	   popular	   and	   controversial	   in	   recent	  years.	  With	   such	   tests	   increasingly	   being	  proffered	   for	   use	   in	   the	   court-­‐room	  —	  to	  either	  support	  or	  call	  into	  question	  testimony	  —	  it	  would	  be-­‐hoove	  the	  legal	  system	  to	  have	  some	  systematic	  framework	  for	  ensuring	  that	   they	   are	   used	   responsibly.	   In	   this	   paper,	   I	   defend	   one	   such	   frame-­‐work	  for	  ensuring	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case:	  the	  legitimacy	  enhancing	  test.	  Ac-­‐cording	  to	  this	  test,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  make	  use	  of	  technologies	  such	  as	  the	   P300	  MDT	  whenever	   doing	   so	  would	   (probably)	   enhance	   the	   legiti-­‐macy	  of	  the	  trial.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  test	  addresses	  tensions	  between	  scien-­‐tific	  and	  legal	  norms	  of	  evidence,	  and	  exhibits	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  vir-­‐tues	  including	  unification,	  simplicity	  and	  flexibility.	  	  	  
 
1. Introduction 
The set-up is a familiar one. A nervous suspect, his body wired-up to record his 
autonomic responses, sits in the chair. An intimidating questioner hovers nearby, a 
list of questions in her hand. She starts off easy, asking the suspect to state his 
name and date of birth. But soon things escalate in emotional intensity. She asks 
awkward questions about his childhood, such as “Did you ever lie to get out of 
trouble?”. Finally, she moves into the core of the interview: “Where were you on 
the night of the 25th?”, “Did you kill the victim?”. 
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This scenario, played out on screen in an endless series of police procedurals, 
describes the essence of the classic polygraph1 lie detector test. The test, originally 
developed by John A. Larson in 1921,2 is an object of suspicion and cultural ob-
session. It speaks to our fears and desires. On the one hand, anything that allows 
us to look past the often biased and distorted nature of testimony, to the real inten-
tions and motivations of the speaker, could be a major boon to the legal system. 
But on the other hand, anything that looks beneath our public expressions, and 
into the workings of our minds, seems to threaten our cognitive autonomy, invade 
our privacy, and erode our sense of trust. Little wonder then that, since the earliest 
days, the polygraph test has never truly been welcomed by courts of law.3 (Note: 
references to courts of law throughout this paper are to those found in the Anglo-
American legal systems most familiar to the author, specifically: Ireland, England 
and Wales, and the United States. No claims are made about continental legal sys-
tems.) 
But that is the past, this paper is concerned with the future. Since 1921 things 
have changed. New, more sophisticated, versions of the lie-detecter test have 
arisen, with the latest wave incorporating brain-imaging techniques;4 and alterna-
tive “mind-reading” tests have been proposed, developed and investigated.5 One 
particular alternative is the P300 memory detection test (MDT6), which, instead of 
detecting deception, locates forensically valuable information in a person’s brain. 
Already used, with minimal success,7 in legal trials, there are an increasing num-
ber of advocates for the forensic use of this technology.8 The question is whether 
the advocates are right that this technology should be more welcome than its con-
troversial predecessors? 
                                                           
1 Iacono (2008); National Academies of the Sciences (2003); Furedy, J. (1996); 
Furedy, J., and Heselgrave, R. (1988); Ben-Shakar, G. (2002) 
2 Adler, K. (2007) 
3 On the early rejection of the lie detector test, see Frye v United States (1923) 
293 F. 1013. Schauer, F. (2012) 
4 Schauer (2012) and Schauer, F. (2010 
5 Verscheure, Ben-Shakar and Meijer (2011). 
6 I take the name from Meegan, D. (2008). Roughly equivalent terms are 
“Guilty Knowledge Test” or “Concealed Information Test”, but both of those 
carry unwelcome pejorative implications (guilt in the first instance and conceal-
ment in the second). “Memory Detection” is a more neutral, yet still descriptively 
appropriate term. 
7 Lawrence Farwell famously started the company Brainwave Science in order 
to push the forensic use of his “brainfingerprinting” version of the P300 MDT. A 
full analysis of his attempts can be found in Rosenfeld, J. (2005). A response to 
this can be found in Farwell, L. (2011) 
8 Verscheure et al (2011) includes several papers that speak in glowing terms 
about memory detection tests. 
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This paper tries to answer that question by defending a novel framework for the 
responsible use of the P300 MDT.  The framework, building on concepts from 
democratic theory and social epistemology, provides a simple, unifying test for the 
responsible use of the P300 MDT. This in turn feeds into an analysis of the re-
sponsible innovation of any social system that generates judgments of truth and 
falsity (hereinafter called “social epistemic systems”).9 Thus, the paper aims not 
only to discuss a particular technology, but also to build an evaluative bridge be-
tween norms of scientific and technological success, and norms for the successful 
design of social epistemic systems, such as the legal trial.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I briefly out-
line some of the salient features of the P300 MDT, explaining how it is distinct 
from the more widely-discussed fMRI lie detector, and highlighting the benefits 
and risks associated with the technology. In section 3, I analyse some tensions be-
tween scientific and legal standards of evidential success, recently highlighted by 
Frederick Schauer, which can affect our willingness to make use of forensic tech-
niques of this sort, and which are not satisfactorily addressed by existing tests for 
the admissibility of scientific evidence. In section 4, I propose and defend a novel 
framework that tries to resolve these tensions, something I call the Legitimacy-
Enhancing Test (LET). This gives a roadmap for the responsible use of emerging 
technologies, and a roadmap for the responsible innovation of the legal trial. Fi-
nally, in section 5, I apply this test to the P300 MDT. 
 
 
2. The Allure of the P300 MDT 
A memory detection test (MDT) is a test that purports to detect the presence of 
certain memories in a person’s mind. The P300 MDT is simply one instance of 
such a test.10 It relies on electro-encephalographic (EEG) imaging, which is used 
to record variations in electrical activity across different regions of the brain.11 The 
brain displays constant and sometimes consistent variation in electrical activity 
(brainwave patterns), with some patterns being associated with certain types of 
conscious awareness (e.g. delta waves are associated with sleep).  
If a discrete stimulus is presented to a subject who is hooked-up to an EEG, a 
“blip” in the otherwise constantly varying levels of activity can be detected. This 
is known as an evoked response potential (ERP). The P300 is particular kind of 
ERP that seems to arise whenever recognised, meaningful and rare stimuli are pre-
sented to a test subject.12 As a result, the P300 is thought to be an ideal candidate 
for a MDT. If the testing paradigm is robust enough, and if it is protected from 
confounding variables, then the detection of a P300 in a test subject could be a re-
                                                           
9 The phrase “social epistemic systemic” is derived from Koppl. R. (2006) 
10 Meegan (2008) and Verscheure et al (2011) discuss other variants. 
11 Rosenfeld, P.J. (2011) and Meegan (2008) 
12 Polich, J. (2007) 
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liable indicator of their recognition of certain information. If that information is 
taken, for example, from a crime scene, then the results of the P300 MDT might 
help to link a suspect to a crime scene, in a manner somewhat analogous to the use 
of DNA-matching. This would make the test forensically useful.13 
It is no surprise then to learn there are those who advocate its forensic use. Per-
haps the most conspicuous advocate is Lawrence Farwell, one of the original pio-
neers of the P300 MDT,14 who developed his own patented version of the test 
(sometimes referred to as “brain fingerprinting”)15 and received some reasonably 
high-profile media exposure for his efforts to get it accepted by the courts. Those 
efforts were successful in one case, with a court16 admitting the evidence under the 
so-called Daubert test (discussed below), though the technique proved less suc-
cessful in a later case.17 In subsequent years, Farwell has involved himself in clas-
sified military and security service tests of his technique,18 before recently re-
emerging to the public eye to argue for the strengths of his version of the P300 
MDT. 
There are, of course, critics of Farwell’s test.19 One criticism of the test con-
cerns the forensic uses to which it has been put. In the Harrington decision, in 
which the results of a P300 MDT were admitted to court, the test was used to ex-
culpate a prisoner who had served 24 years in jail. The results of the test suppos-
edly showed that certain information relevant to a crime was not present in the de-
fendant’s brain, but that information relevant to his alibi was. Now, it is somewhat 
doubtful that this had a significant effect on the decision of the court since a key 
witness in the earlier case had also recanted his testimony, but in any event, as 
Rosenfeld points out,20 the forensic value of Farwell’s test result in this context 
was practically nil. Memories are constantly distorted, reconstructed and rewritten 
                                                           
13 It should be noted that, as with DNA-matching, the fact that an accused per-
son can be linked to a crime scene does not equate with their guilt, obviously addi-
tional steps are needed for that. 
14 Farwell, L. and Donchin, E. (1991) 
15 For general details, see Farwell’s company webpage, formerly located at 
www.brainwavescience.com, but now at www.governmentworks.com/bws. The 
unique feature of Farwell’s test is that in addition to recording the P300 response it 
also focuses on something Farwell calls the MERMER response. Having been 
rather inactive in the academic community for a number of years (apparently due 
to military testing of his technique), Farwell has recently returned to publishing, 
with a number of research and review articles touting the strengths and weak-
nesses of his techniques. Farwell, L, Richardson, D, and Richardson, G. (2012); 
and Farwell, L. (2012) 
16 Harrington v. State of Iowa 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003) 
17 Slaughter v. State of Oklahoma 105 P.3d 832 (Oklahoma 2005) 
18 Farwell, Richardson and Richardson (2012). 
19 Rosenfeld, J. P (2005) and Meegan (2008) 
20 Rosenfeld (2005) 
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over the course of time. A person who was actually present at a crime scene 20 
years ago may have forgotten certain details that the P300 MDT tries to test them 
on, thus resulting in a negative test that is not truly exculpatory. Similarly, a per-
son who has rehearsed their alibi story for over 20 years could well recognise in-
formation connected with that story, despite it not being true.21 There are also a 
number of ethical concerns associated with the technology. Most obviously, mis-
application of an epistemically faulty or unreliable test will degrade the quality of 
legal decision-making, which is itself ethically undesirable. In addition to this, 
concerns have been expressed about the effects of such techniques on cognitive 
liberty and autonomy.22 Nevertheless, there remains considerable enthusiasm 
about the forensic uses of MDTs23 and even the critics of Farwell’s test have pro-
posed alternative, and they believe more reliable, versions of the P300 MDT.24 
This wave of enthusiasm shows no signs of abating.25 
At this juncture, and since it will become relevant later, it is worth briefly con-
sidering the differences between the P300 MDT and another type of test that has 
received considerable attention and (some) enthusiastic support in recent years, 
namely: fMRI lie detection.26 Like the P300 MDT, fMRI lie detection tests have 
received at least one day in court,27 though, as with the classic polygraph test, they 
failed to find a sympathetic audience. Still, as with the P300 MDT, there are those 
promote their forensic use28 and those who are deeply concerned.29  
So what are the differences between the two tests? Well, there are many, but 
two are important for present purposes. First, like the classic lie detector test, 
                                                           
21 Allen, J.J.B. & Mertens, R. (2009) 
22 Sententia, Wyre (2004); Sententia, Wyre (2001); and Halliburton, C. (2007) 
23 See Verscheure et al (2011) for some notably enthusiastic discussions of such 
tests. One contributor (Patrick) argues that MDTs are an “idea whose time has 
come”, p. 9, and another (Iacono) makes the case for its widespread use by law en-
forcement, pp 12-27. 
24 Rosenfeld is developing a version of the P300 MDT that makes use of some-
thing he calls the complex trial protocol. This, along with certain other testing 
techniques, makes the test more accurate and less prone to countermeasures. This 
is something I discuss in more detail in section 4. A list of his most recent publica-
tions can be found at: 
http://groups.psych.northwestern.edu/rosenfeld/publications.html 
25 Farwell and Rosenfeld are the most prominent examples of this, with Farwell 
publishing six articles on his technique since 2011, and Rosenfeld publishing five 
in 2012 alone. See both authors webpages for copies of the relevant papers. 
26 Schauer (2012) contains an overview of the debate about fMRI lie detection. 
I discuss fMRI lie detection in more depth in Danaher J. (2011b) and (2011a) 
27 United States v Semrau, No. 07-10074 M1/P (W.D. Tenn. May 31, 2010). 
28 Most notably two companies Cephos Corp (www.cephoscorp.com) and No-
Lie MRI (www.noliemri.com) 
29 Greely, H. T. and Illes, J. (2007) 
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fMRI techniques usually30 rely on a testing format — the control question test — 
of dubious reliability. Since the goal of a lie detection test is to determine whether 
a suspect is lying or not, the emotional saliency of the test questions is an impor-
tant feature of the test. But emotional saliency is difficult to control and is some-
thing that can be manipulated by the tester and altered by the context of the test. 
This has been thought to undermine the reliability of the test.31 The P300 MDT 
seems to avoid these problems because the goal of the test is not to determine de-
ception, but to determine whether certain information is recognised. It is thought 
to be easier to create proper “control” questions in this format,32 which improves 
the reliability of the technique. Allied to this is the second main difference be-
tween the tests, which has to do with the nature of the error rates associated with 
them. While figures vary between experimental tests, Schauer suggests, from a re-
view of the evidence, that the accuracy of fMRI lie detection ranges between 70-
90%. Noticeably, however, the number of false positive errors in fMRI tests can 
be quite high, ranging upwards of 20% in some cases. This presents a significant 
contrast with the P300 MDT. Although error rates for that test vary considerably 
too — with several tests reporting accuracy of near 100%33 but others offering 
much lower accuracy rates (as low as 27%) in more realistic mock-crime tests or 
when the risk of false memories is high34 — they are heavily skewed toward the 
false negative type of error. In other words, the test frequently says that informa-
tion which should have been recognised by a test subject was not, or reaches an 
inconclusive outcome. At the same time, whenever it does say that information 
was recognised, it is pretty good indicator that this was indeed the case. This 
means that the test could have high probative value, higher than fMRI lie detec-
tion, provided it is used correctly. This is a point to which I shall return below.  
In sum, the P300 MDT is an emerging forensic technique with a great deal of 
potential, but also with significant attendant risks. It is importantly different from 
a similar emerging technology, fMRI lie detection, in terms of its test format and 
its accuracy rates. Given its potential and its risks, it forms an interesting case 
study in the responsible use of emerging technologies.  
 
 
                                                           
30 Note: since fMRI is simply an imaging-technique, it could potentially be 
used as the basis for a MDT. This is discussed in Gamer (2011). Nevertheless, this 
has not been developed to a significant extent yet. The P300 EEG-based technique 
has been much more fully developed. 
31 See Furedy, J. (1996) and (1988); and Ganis, G. and Rosenfeld, J.P. (2011) 
32 Verscheure et al (2011) on the advantages of the MDT. Note that deception 
may indirectly feature as part of the test. Rosenfeld, J.P. (2012 
33 Farwell, Richardson and Richardson (2012) and Iacono in Verscheure et al 
(2011) (focusing on MDTs more generally) 
34 Allen and Mertens (2009); and Mertens and Allen (2008) 
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3. The Law and Innovative Forensic Technolo-
gies 
With a basic understanding of the P300 MDT in place, we can now consider 
exactly how the legal system should approach a novel forensic technology of this 
sort. In doing so a key theme emerges: there is a connection between the responsi-
ble use of innovative technologies of this sort, and the responsible innovation of 
an epistemic system such as the legal trial. In the attempt to develop and analyse 
that theme, this section performs two key functions. First, it explains what it 
means to call the legal trial an “epistemic system” and highlights the role of foren-
sic technologies such as the P300 MDT in that system. Second, it identifies some 
tensions between legal and scientific standards for evidential success which may 
affect how and when such forensic technologies are used. This paves the way for 
the development of a novel framework in section 4. 
 
 
3.1 The trial as an epistemic system 
Following Koppl,35 an epistemic system is here defined as any social system 
that (at least sometimes) generates judgments of truth or falsity. Typically, such 
systems involve interactions between two or more strategic agents, i.e. agents who 
must compete or cooperate with one another in order to secure their preferred out-
comes. Koppl identifies two broad classes of such agents, senders and receivers, 
the former send information through the system, the latter interpret that informa-
tion and issue a judgment of truth or falsity. The roles can overlap in one particu-
lar individual. When dressed in more formal garb, and when taking advantage of 
some ideas from game and information theory, Koppl’s seemingly simple sender-
receiver model can be transformed into a powerful tool for the analysis and design 
of social epistemic systems. 
Such formalisms are not necessary for understanding the argument in this pa-
per. All that matters here is that the legal trial can be understood as a social system 
that both generates judgments of truth and falsity, and that involves interactions 
between strategic agents.36 This is easily illustrated by reference to the classic 
model of legal decision-making, which although it is certainly incomplete, and 
doesn’t do justice to the complexities of human reasoning, still has its essence cap-
tured by the following syllogistic pattern: 
 
(1) If S did X, then legal consequence Y follows (legal rule) 
 
(2) S did X (factum probandum)  
                                                           
35 Koppl (2006) 
36 Danaher, J. (2011a) 
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(3) Therefore, legal consequence Y follows (verdict/ruling). 
 
To be sure, legal cases can often be more complex than this, with many chains 
of syllogisms linked together in one trial, but the basic pattern of reasoning re-
mains the same. It is this pattern, particularly the second premise in this pattern, 
that highlights the epistemic dimension of the trial. For it is this premise that states 
the factum probandum — the key legal fact that needs to be proved in each case 
— and the proof of that premise will be determined by strategic interactions be-
tween different legal agents. 
We can see this by considering the dynamics of the trial in more depth. In order 
to prove the factum probandum, the court relies on evidence. This evidence is 
usually presented to the court in the form of testimony. In other words, witnesses 
are put before the court and asked to tell the court what they saw or what they ex-
perienced or, exceptionally in the case of experts, to offer opinions about what 
might have happened. The problem is that, at least in common law jurisdictions, 
the system is adversarial. Both sides want to prove different things, they present 
different witnesses to help them do so, and these witnesses oftentimes contradict 
one another. Thus, it becomes difficult for the court to figure out where the truth 
really lies, which in turn makes it difficult for it to perform its epistemic function 
in a fair and reliable manner. 
Interestingly, it is this very property of the trial that highlights the allure of fo-
rensic technologies like the P300 MDT or the fMRI lie detector. When witnesses 
are incentivised to either mislead or, at a minimum, not to assist the court in the 
fulfillment of its epistemic function— as they are given the strategic dynamics of 
the adversarial trial — we have the problem of false or absent testimony. To over-
come this problem, courts can adopt two strategies: (a) incentivise the presentation 
of truthful testimony (which they do through the use of subpoenas, perjury laws 
and the like) or (b) use some forensic technology to bypass or correct for false or 
absent testimony. MDTs and lie detector tests are examples of strategy (b). An 
MDT can allow a court to link a suspect to a crime scene, irrespective of their ac-
tual testimony, by checking to see whether their brains respond to crime-relevant 
information. Similarly, a lie detector test could allow the court to infer general 
deceptiveness on the part of a witness,37 which would enable them to make judg-
ments about the reliability of their testimony. Of course, this can only happen if 
the tests are valid and reliable, but assuming they are the benefits could be signifi-
cant. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that even though judgments of truth or 
falsity play an important role in the trial, and improving the accuracy of those 
judgments is a major policy concern, the epistemic dimension of the trial is com-
plemented by a number of normative and ethical dimensions. The trial is not sim-
                                                           
37 Though, problematically this is all they seem capable of doing. See Danaher 
(2011b) 
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ply an instrument for reaching judgments about the truth or falsity of particular 
claims; it is a procedure that protects and respects the central moral qualities of the 
people who operate within it. Thus, there are procedural norms associated with the 
standards of proof, the right to a fair trial, and the protection of vulnerable wit-
nesses. These norms play a significant part in determining whether it is appropri-
ate to make use of novel forensic technologies like the P300 MDT, as we shall 
see. 
To summarise, the legal trial is an epistemic system, i.e. a social system that is 
(at least partly) concerned with generating judgments of truth or falsity. The abil-
ity of this system to generate more accurate judgments of truth or falsity could be 
greatly assisted by the use of novel forensic technologies such as the P300 MDT, 
but when assessing whether and when it is appropriate to do this, we need to bear 
in mind the ethical/normative dimension of the system too. 
 
3.2 Problems with existing admissibility tests 
The next question is whether existing protocols and tests for deciding on the 
use novel forensic technologies are fit for purpose? In other words, do they allow 
for the effective use of such technologies in a manner that is sensitive to the epis-
temic and ethical/normative dimensions of the trial? The claim I wish to defend is 
that they are not, and in doing so I clarify and build upon some arguments made 
by Frederick Schauer in relation to the use of fMRI lie detection.38 Schauer’s con-
cern is not to directly challenge existing protocols and tests – though he does ges-
ture in that direction39 – but rather to highlight important tensions between scien-
tific and legal norms of evidential value. These tensions represent faultlines 
between the scientific and legal epistemic systems that will need to be addressed 
by any proposed framework. 
Schauer notes that, from its earliest days, the lie detector test it has struggled to 
win acceptance in the courts. This trend has continued despite the advent of newer 
versions of the test using fMRI imaging techniques. This is also true of the P300 
MDT which, despite some initial success, is generally treated with a good deal of 
trepidation by both researchers, lawyers and courts.40 Schauer questions the ten-
ability of this trend by defending one overarching claim, which we may call 
“Schauer’s Thesis”: 
 
Schauer’s Thesis: Whether fMRI lie detection (or P300 MDT) evidence 
should be admitted to court is not simply a question of its scientific validity 
and reliability, it also (perhaps primarily) a question of the normative and 
                                                           
38 Schauer (2012) and (2010) 
39 Schauer (2010) from p. 1214 onwards, where he offers some critique of 
Daubert. 
40 Rosenfeld in Verscheure et al (2011); and Meegan (2008) 
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ethical function of the law. That is to say, questions of evidential utility are 
fundamentally determined by legal-ethical standards, not purely scientific 
ones. 
 
This claim is significant in that current tests for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, such as DNA fingerprinting and other forensic techniques, rely heavily 
on, though are not isomorphic with, scientific standards of validity and reliability. 
For instance the Daubert test, which is now advocated for introduction in the 
UK,41 states that judges should assess scientific evidence by referring to the indi-
cia of reliability that are common in the scientific world. These indicia include 
things like “known error rates”, “general acceptance within the relevant scientific 
community”, “testability” and “passing peer review”. The problem is that this ap-
proach can yield significant legal territory to the norms of scientific inquiry, and 
while this may often be appropriate, Schauer’s Thesis suggests that these territo-
ries may have very different topographies. What scientists rightfully deem “good 
evidence” and what legal theorists rightfully deem “good evidence” may be two 
different things. It is important not to lose sight of this.  
Schauer supports his thesis with two arguments, which we shall call the “proba-
tive context” and the “epistemic progress” arguments. Let’s look first at the proba-
tive context argument. The key premise of this argument is that the value of any 
evidence placed before a court depends largely on three factors: 
 
Probability: Does the evidence raise or lower the probability of the factum 
probandum and if so, by how much does it raise or lower its probability? 
 
Standard of Proof: What confidence threshold must the probability of the 
factum probandum cross in order for it to count as being proved or not 
proved? 
 
Legal Purpose: Is the evidence being submitted in order to prove or dis-
prove the factum probandum? 
 
The probative context varies depending on the legal issue at stake, and the 
party on whose behalf the evidence is proffered. For example, in criminal cases, 
the standard of proof for the prosecution is beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a 
notoriously fuzzy standard, but suppose that it corresponds to a 95% (0.95) prob-
ability of the factum probandum being true. In that case, in order to secure a con-
viction, the prosecution would need to introduce a body of evidence that (in its to-
tality) raises the probability of the factum probandum to the 95% threshold. 
Contrariwise, the defence would succeed if they could introduce evidence that 
prevented the probability from crossing that 95% threshold. Thus, the probative 
                                                           
41 Law Commission (2011) 
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value of the evidence varies depending on who is presenting it, which is another of 
the variables of the probative context. 
This is important because it feeds into the assessment of the value of lie detec-
tion or MDT evidence. Schauer notes that fMRI lie detector tests have reported 
accuracy rates that vary from 70-90%.42 This might seem scientifically unimpres-
sive, but they are better than chance at identifying deceptive individuals, and in 
the right context this could be probatively valuable. For example, in a criminal 
trial, although a 70% accuracy rate might not suffice to prove that someone is 
guilty, it might suffice to prove reasonable doubt. So, for instance, if I am 70% 
likely to be telling the truth about my alibi when I am being charged for murder, 
then (Bayesian considerations to one side) it might be highly useful for the court 
to be made aware of this fact. Breaking it down, the argument Schauer is making 
looks something like this: 
 
(4) In its present form(s), the accuracy rate of fMRI lie detection is some-
where between 70% and 90%.  
 
(5) In some probative contexts, a 70% likelihood that X is telling the 
truth/lying is highly probative.  
 
(6) Therefore, fMRI lie detection could be useful (even in its present form) 
in some probative contexts. 
 
Thus we have the probative context argument. It should be pointed at that 
premise (2) can be defended with a number of examples. The criminal example is 
used here because it is possibly the most straightforward, but in civil trials the 
standard of proof is much lower (balance of probabilities) and hence the lie detec-
tor test could be highly probative in those contexts too, despite seemingly low ac-
curacy rates. The same argument could be co-opted into the defence of the foren-
sic use of the P300 MDT. The tendency of that test to yield fewer false positives 
and more false negatives. A test with those features could be highly useful in some 
contexts. There is no need to dwell on the technicalities here though. The impor-
tant point is that decisions about the utility of evidence need to be highly sensitive 
to the probative context in which that evidence is presented, which is something 
they cannot be if they are overly-beholden to scientific standards of epistemic suc-
cess since the probative context of science is quite different. 
Another problem with existing approaches to determining whether novel foren-
sic technologies should be used is the problem of status quo bias.43 Schauer illus-
trates this with the epistemic progress argument.  
                                                           
42 Schauer (2012) 
43 A general problem in applied ethical reasoning. See Bostrom, N. and Ord, T. 
(2006) 
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An epistemic system can be said to under progress whenever there is some 
overall improvement in its epistemic efficiency. “Efficiency” is defined as a 
measure of the likelihood of the system reaching a true judgment.44 The basic idea 
is that epistemic progress is a good thing, and that any reform to the system that 
allows it to progress would be welcome provided it does not compromise the ethi-
cal/normative aspects of the system (a point to which I shall return). Epistemic 
progress is always assessed relative to the existing level of epistemic efficiency. 
Thus, if we wished to argue in favour of a particular reform, we would have to do 
so by directly referencing the current level of efficiency. This relativistic aspect of 
epistemic progress has one interesting effect: if the current level of epistemic effi-
ciency is low, then a proposed reform to that system, even one with an unimpres-
sive level of overall accuracy, may nevertheless be warranted on the grounds that 
it still raises the efficiency of the system.  
Schauer argues that this could be true in the case of fMRI lie detection. He does 
so by highlighting how existing solutions to the false or absent testimony problem 
are lacking. For example, historically, the administration of the religious oath was 
thought to incentivise truth-telling. In a culture in thrall to the fear of God and 
hell, this may have held some sway, but in its modern secular form the oath relies 
on the desire to be honest and the threat of perjury to do its work. Arguably, nei-
ther of these are particularly effective and certainly have no known accuracy rates. 
So with just the oath to protect us from false testimony, the epistemic efficiency of 
the trial is unclear. Similarly, robust cross examination, though often lauded, is un-
likely to be effective at resolving the problem. As Schauer notes, cross examina-
tion may expose inconsistencies in certain cases, but is unlikely to do so in the 
case of the seasoned or practiced liar (movie depictions notwithstanding). In these 
cases we may be left with contradictory testimonies, which can be very difficult 
for a jury to assess. Furthermore, as with the oath, there are no known accuracy 
rates associated with cross-examination. In light of these comparators, the admis-
sion of fMRI lie detection would seem to represent epistemic progress. Since it 
does have known accuracy rates, and since it can do something to break the dead-
lock between contradictory testimonies, it could lead to epistemic progress. Again, 
something similar could be true in the case of the P300 MDT, although that tech-
nique might have a greater impact on the problem of absent testimony. 
Schauer’s two arguments help to readjust our perspective on the relationship 
between the legal trial and novel forensic technologies such as the P300 MDT. But 
they are not entirely satisfactory. For one thing, it is possible to dispute some of 
his factual claims about fMRI lie detection.45 For another, it is not clear whether 
they mount a serious challenge to existing protocols or tests for determining the 
utility of novel forensic techniques. Is a new framework really needed to address 
Schauer’s concerns? 
                                                           
44 The term and its definition are taken from Koppl (2006) 
45 Schauer (2012) deals with some such criticisms. 
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If we assume that the current framework is represented by some version of the 
Daubert test, then it is possible to argue that there isn’t really a problem. A 
Daubert-style test, as mentioned earlier, requires judges to assess the merits of sci-
entific evidence by reference to a number of commonly-recognised indicia of reli-
ability: error rates, peer review, sound methodology and so on. And while these 
are scientific indicia, there is no reason why an attentive mind could not apply 
those standards in a manner that is consistent with the epistemic and normative 
aims of the legal system. Thus, for example, a judge could look to the known error 
rate of a forensic technique that falls below what might be desirable for scientific 
purposes, but can still accept it if the probative context of the law would benefit 
from it. There is nothing in a Daubert-style test that prevents him or her from do-
ing so. The test does not subordinate the law to science. 
On a purely formal level, then, a Daubert-style test is neutral with respect to the 
types of concerns raised by Schauer: it doesn’t actively seek to address them, nor 
does it actively exacerbate them. It is a small part of the overall apparatus the law 
uses to determine which kinds of evidence are worth considering and which are 
not. But this formal neutrality is itself problematic. By not actively directing our 
attention to Schauer’s concerns, it is too easy for the person adopting the test to 
lose sight of epistemic progress and probative context. Arguably this is what 
Schauer shows to have happened in relation to polygraph and fMRI lie detector 
tests. This is compounded by the fact that, in terms of historical impetus, Daubert 
was created to address the problem of “junk” science, i.e. to close the doors of the 
court to bad forensic evidence. As Schauer himself points out, this historical back-
ground tends to support the status quo within the legal system, which may actually 
be improved by “bad” forensic techniques.46 
One might suppose that simple emendations to the Daubert-test could solve the 
problem. By adding additional criteria to the test, we could overcome its neutrality 
and encourage active engagement with epistemic progress and probative context. 
Perhaps we could, but this would be a partial solution at best. This modified 
Daubert would still only look to the epistemic dimension of the trial and how 
some of the particular norms of the legal system play an important role in deter-
mining the probative value of evidence. This leaves other normative considera-
tions in the lurch, either to be ignored or to be dealt with by other evidentiary 
rules. For example, Schauer himself explicitly considers the role of the rule 
against “unfair prejudice” in determining the admissibility of fMRI lie detection 
evidence.47 According to this rule, otherwise epistemically reliable evidence is to 
be excluded from the trial if juries are likely to give it undue weight in their delib-
erations. As he points out, preliminary research has revealed that people are more 
persuaded by neuroscience-based evidence than they should be, which suggests it 
might have an unfairly prejudicial effect.48 Whether this is true need not concern 
                                                           
46 Schauer (2010), pp. 1216-17 
47 Schauer (2012) and Goldberg, D. (2008) 
48 Klaming, L. (2011) is somewhat more tentative on this point than Schauer. 
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us now, what is significant is how Schauer considers this issue after making his 
two general arguments in favour of his core thesis (about the role of legal and 
evaluative considerations in determining the admissibility of evidence), treating it 
as an additional point, not something that is intimately bound-up with the norma-
tive concerns motivating the earlier arguments. This represents a general problem 
with evidence law: there are many rules governing the exclusion of certain types 
of evidence, each of which affects how the trial system develops, but which are 
lacking some underlying unifying theory49 about the normative function of the 
trial. 
This should not be the case. A theoretical framework that provided a grounding 
for Schauer’s arguments could be used to assess forensic techniques, and also to 
assess other normative and procedural aspects of the legal trial. It would not only 
give us a roadmap for the responsible use of novel technologies like the P300 
MDT, but a roadmap for the responsible innovation of an epistemic system like 
the legal trial. The job of the next section is to provide that theoretical framework. 
 
 
4. The Legitimacy Enhancing Test 
The proposed framework is grounded in the notion of legitimacy. Put most 
simply, it requires a court (or other agency) when tasked with considering reforms 
to the trial – where “reforms” is taken to include decisions as to evidential admis-
sibility – to ask whether that reform would enhance the legitimacy of the trial. The 
result is the legitimacy enhancing test (LET). This deceptively simply test allows 
the court to draw upon a rich theoretical literature about the nature of legitimacy 
conditions, which in turn bring together the disparate normative considerations 
highlighted in the preceding section. The remainder of this section will defend this 
test. It does so in two parts. First, it sets out the basic elements of the test, simpli-
fying it to an argument with two premises: a normative premise and a factual 
premise. It then discusses each premise in sequence, noting how they supply the 
theoretical depth and unity absent from Schauer’s analysis. The arguments here 
are programmatic, intending to provide stimulus for future debate and research, 
not a comprehensive defence of the test. Areas in which the theoretical basis of the 
test needs further elaboration will be highlighted, though in doing so I try to indi-
cate how I think that elaboration could work. 
 
4.1 The test itself 
A central concept — perhaps the central concept — in contemporary political 
theory is that of legitimacy.50 The concept addresses the basic challenge of politi-
                                                           
49 Laudan, L (2011) 
50 Peter, F. (2008) and (2007) 
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cal authority, namely that the exercise of authority tends to be coercive and auton-
omy-undermining. That is to say: whenever the government exerts its authority, 
the result is typically that somebody, somewhere, is forced to do something they 
would otherwise have preferred not to do. Prima facie, this is unjustifiable. The 
notion of legitimacy is what rescues political authority from this prima facie un-
justifiability because a coercive rule or practice becomes justifiable if it satisfies a 
set of legitimacy conditions. 
The LET takes advantage of this concept in formulating a test for determining 
whether novel forensic technologies should be used in the legal trial. What’s more 
it does so in a way that is sensitive to the probative context, the relativistic nature 
of epistemic progress, and the other normative dimensions of the trial. To see this, 
we can start by sketching the structure of the test, which can be reduced to a sim-
ple syllogistic argument.  
 
(7) If a change to an epistemic system with coercive powers (such as the 
legal trial) would enhance the legitimacy of that system, then that change is 
to be welcomed (normative premise) 
 
(8) Change X would/would not enhance the legitimacy of the trial (factual 
premise). 
 
(9) Therefore, change X is/is not to be welcomed. 
 
The word “change” is used in the broadest possible sense. An epistemic system 
such as the trial could be changed by a number of things, with the use of novel fo-
rensic technologies being  but one example of a change. It is this broadness that al-
lows the LET to not only provide guidance about the responsible use of a novel 
forensic technology, but also to provide guidance for the responsible innovation of 
the epistemic system as a whole. 
In practical terms, the LET works like this: whenever a court (or other agent 
within an epistemic system) must consider a change to that system, they simply 
ask themselves whether the above argument is true, or probably true, in the case of 
the proposed change. By focusing on legitimacy enhancement the LET will direct 
their attention to the need for epistemic progress relative to the status quo, and by 
focusing on legitimacy it will direct their attention to the epistemic and normative 
concerns mentioned in the preceding section. In doing so, the normative premise 
supplies the theoretical background missing from Schauer’s analysis and the 
modified Daubert test: it grounds, unifies and expands our assessment in a way 
that those proposals do not. Let’s unpack this in a little more detail. 
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4.2 The premises in practice 
Although the truth of the normative premise need not be considered in practice 
– it can be taken as a background normative presupposition – some defence of it is 
in order here. In brief: legitimacy conditions must be met in order for a coercive 
act of political authority to be justified. The rationale for this is grounded in a lib-
eral model of the state, according to which the default moral position in society is 
one of non-intervention in individual autonomy. Deviations from the default posi-
tion need to be justified to the citizenry.51 Legitimacy conditions are what deter-
mine whether this can be done. Hence, the method of justification is through the 
satisfaction of legitimacy conditions. Since the trial plays an important role in the 
exercise of coercive political authority,52 it follows that it needs to be justified in 
light of legitimacy conditions.53 This is why the normative premise is appropriate 
in this context. Interestingly, this highlights a limitation of the LET: it only applies 
to epistemic systems with some coercive power. If the system has no coercive 
power, then the legitimacy test is inappropriate. However, that limitation is not 
particularly severe since a good number of social epistemic systems have coercive 
power and it is oftentimes the fact that they deliver judgments of truth or falsity 
that grants them this power. 
The strengths of the normative premise lie in how the concept of legitimacy 
gets fleshed out. There is a rich philosophical debate about which conditions sup-
ply the legitimacy needed for political justification. This debate has generated two 
distinct schools of thought: proceduralism and instrumentalism.54 According to 
proceduralism, what legitimates a coercive decision are the features of the proce-
dure through which that decision was made; according to instrumentalism, what 
legitimates a coercive decision are the outputs of the procedure, specifically 
whether those outputs reach or get close to the right conclusion, normatively 
and/or epistemically speaking. Applying this to the trial, proceduralism would be 
concerned with the propriety of the trial procedure itself, i.e. whether it provides a 
forum in which the accused can be heard, whether it is biased and unfairly preju-
dicial, whether it respects individual autonomy, privacy and so on. On the other 
hand, instrumentalism would be concerned with whether the trial reaches the right 
verdict. This would be the case, in part at least, if the correct verdict about the fac-
tum probandum is reached. 
The goal here is not to privilege one particular theory of legitimacy over an-
other. Quite the opposite in fact. I suspect all the major theories highlight proper-
                                                           
51 Gaus, G. (2003); and (2010) 
52 I discuss this at great length in Danaher, J. (2013) 
53 This is not to say that the normative function of the trial reduces to that of le-
gitimacy, merely that legitimacy is an important part of the normative justification 
of the trial, whatever its normative function may be. 
54 On proceduralism: Machin, D. (2009); Estlund, D. (1993) and (2003); Peter, 
F. (2008). On instrumentalism: List and Goodin (2001); and Marti, J.L (2005) 
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ties that normatively ideal epistemic systems exemplify and the goal is to bring all 
of those properties into consideration under the common umbrella of “legitimacy 
conditions”. Thus, I propose that in using the LET we adopt a “mixed” account of 
legitimacy. In doing so, we provide a unifying framework for assessing the con-
cerns in section 3. Specifically, by paying attention to both the procedural and in-
strumental dimensions of legitimacy, and to the “enhancing” potential of any pro-
posed reform, we can do justice to Schauer’s probative context and epistemic 
progress arguments, as well as the other normative requirements of the trial such 
as respect for autonomy, privacy and moral equality. This can be done by asking 
the following three, deceptively simple, questions: 
 
A. Does the proposed change enhance the non-strategic epistemic effi-
ciency of the trial? 
 
B. Does the proposed change enhance the strategic epistemic efficiency of 
the trial? 
 
C. Does the proposed change enhance the procedural virtues of the trial? 
 
The first two questions deal with the instrumental side of legitimacy, focusing 
as they do on whether the change helps the system reach the right verdict about 
the factum probandum. The third question deals with the procedural side of le-
gitimacy, focusing on whether the proposed change respects the rights of the peo-
ple operating within the system. If one can answer “yes” to each question, then the 
change is acceptable. If the answers vary, then some careful balancing of the pro-
cedural and instrumental advantages will need to be considered. 
On this point, it is important to bear in mind that the LET proposes a multi-
dimensional test for epistemic reform. Broadly speaking, the instrumentalist and 
proceduralist concerns represent the two major dimensions to the test, but these (in 
particular the proceduralist dimension) can probably be broken down into a num-
ber of separate concerns. This raises the spectre of relativism and pluralism in the 
application of the test. It is possible that the many different kinds of legitimacy 
condition covered by the test are not reducible to one another, and therefore that 
reforms which satisfy different sets of those conditions cannot really be assessed 
relative to one another. For instance, maybe a reform which scores highly in terms 
of epistemic efficiency cannot be compared to a reform that scores highly in terms 
of its respect for privacy. This is indeed a serious concern and I can only gesture at 
a response to it here. The response would be that the plurality and irreducibility of 
legitimacy conditions does not entail their incommensurability, nor their incompa-
rability.55 As other have pointed out,56 it is possible to rank plural values relative to 
one another. If that’s right then it is also possible to rank different proposed re-
                                                           
55 See Chang (2013) and forthcoming; and Gaus (2003) on this point. 
56 Chang (2013) and Gaus (2003). 
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forms, relative to the status quo and to one another, even if those proposed reforms 
exemplify different sets of legitimacy condition. Admittedly, however, this is 
something that would require further specification if the LET is to become fully 
persuasive. 
Finally, one potentially confusing aspect of this test is the reference to “strate-
gic” epistemic efficiency in the second question. What differentiates this from 
non-strategic epistemic efficiency? The idea is that since epistemic systems in-
volve interactions between strategic agents, we can never consider the epistemic 
virtues of a proposed change without also considering the effect of that change on 
the incentives of those agents. I consider an illustration of this problem below. 
To summarise, the LET provides a simple, unifying framework for determining 
the responsible use of innovative forensic technologies, and the responsible inno-
vation of the legal trial as a whole. It incorporates the concerns developed by 
Schauer in his analysis of fMRI-based lie detection, but supplies a deeper theoreti-
cal underpinning for those concerns (viz. the concept of legitimacy) which can in 





I conclude by simply applying the LET to the case of the P300 MDT. I do so 
by asking and answering the three questions posed above. The application is not 
exhaustive, and should not be considered to definitively determine whether or not 
the P300 MDT should be used. Rather, it provides an illustration of how the 
framework defended in this article can be used in practice. 
First, would the use of the P300 MDT enhance the non-strategic epistemic effi-
ciency of the trial? The answer to this is “it depends” the probative context since 
that determines the epistemic goals of the trial and the measure of efficiency. The 
clear strength of the technique is that it addresses the false or absent testimony 
problem, it does so in a manner that is better than chance,57 and it could be particu-
larly effective when other methods of addressing the testimony problem (e.g. fin-
gerprint or DNA evidence) are themselves absent. Furthermore, it addresses these 
problems in a manner that enhances epistemic efficiency relative to the status quo. 
This positive assessment must be tempered by some concerns about the ability of 
the test to distinguish true from false memories, and to detect recognition long af-
ter the crime has occurred (tests suggest reliability up to one month afterwards).58 
Protocols that determine when it is not safe to use the test could, however, correct 
for these problems.59 
                                                           
57 See references cited in ns 18-21, all suggest that it is better than chance. 
Also, Meegan (2008) and Verscheure et al. (2011) 
58 Hu and Rosenfeld (2012) 
59 J. Allen (2008) suggests a possible protocol relating to false memory. 
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Second, would the use of the P300 MDT enhance the strategic epistemic effi-
ciency of the trial? If use of the P300 MDT becomes common place in law en-
forcement, it might incentivise changes in behaviour that thwart the utility of the 
test. A classic illustration of this might be the fact that glove-wearing was incen-
tivised following the advent of fingerprint matching. Classic lie detector tests ex-
hibit this kind of strategic weakness because they are vulnerable to countermea-
sures. That is: test subjects can undermine the test by performing voluntary acts 
that reduce its accuracy. This problem has been studied by P300 researchers60 and 
it has been found that complex testing protocols or the subliminal presentation of 
signals to the test subject make it far less vulnerable to countermeasures. This 
suggests that strategic epistemic weakness may not be a problem for this tech-
nique. 
Finally, would the use of the P300 MDT enhance the procedural virtues of the 
trial? A more appropriate question might be: would it reduce or undermine those 
virtues? The answer is far from clear. One major concern might be that the test is 
used in practice as an interrogation prop. That is: the threat of the test is something 
a police investigator uses to force a confession, with the confession then being the 
main piece of evidence used at trial, not the result of the test. This might be 
thought to undermine the accused’s right to a fair trial. It is suggested that strict 
rules for the use of the test could help to overcome this problem, though oversight 
of its actual use will be important. Similarly, although many are concerned about 
the risk of unfair prejudice when it comes to brain-based forensic techniques, this 
is overstated: such risks are present with other kinds of evidence that are routinely 
used,61 and the risk could be minimised by parallel reforms to the jury system.62 
The test may also raise privacy concerns,63 depending on the nature of the evi-
dence collected. But one suspects those are relatively minor since the test, at best, 
may be used to link a suspect to a particular piece of information. This would be 
analogous to the dangers to privacy from matching DNA or fingerprints from the 
crime scene and so the concerns would be no more serious than those raised by 
those techniques. Still, some caution must be expressed. It is possible that the test 
inadvertently uncovers other details about the suspect that have yet to be fully ap-
preciated. For example, perhaps information from the EEG-scabs could be used to 
make inferences to cognitive or intellectual ability. Although I can find no reports 
of this, it is nevertheless something to be wary about in the future. 
In sum, there might be case to be made in favour of the forensic use of the 
P300 MDT, but this case is best made within the framework supplied by the LET. 
This is because the LET creates a systematic and unifying framework for deter-
                                                           
60 Meixner, J. and Rosenfeld, J.P. (2010) 
61 Schauer (2012) 
62 Danaher, J. (2013) 
63 Vedder and Klaming (2010) discuss privacy problems in relation to another 
possible reform of the legal epistemic system: eyewitness enhancement; I respond 
to their arguments at length in Danaher, J. (2013) 
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mining the responsible use of novel forensic technologies, and provides guidelines 
for the responsible innovation of social epistemic systems like the legal trial. Fur-
thermore, the LET does this while remaining sensitive to the epistemic and proce-
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